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ABSTRACT 
Digital crime inflicts immense damage to users and systems and now it has reached a level of sophistication that makes 
it difficult to track its sources or origins especially with the advancements in modern computers, networks and the 
availability of diverse digital devices. Forensic has an important role to facilitate investigations of illegal activities and 
inappropriate behaviors using scientific methodologies, techniques and investigation frameworks. Digital forensic is 
developed to investigate any digital devices in the detection of crime. This paper emphasized on the research of trace- 
ability aspects in digital forensic investigation process. This includes discovering of complex and huge volume of evi- 
dence and connecting meaningful relationships between them. The aim of this paper is to derive a traceability index as a 
useful indicator in measuring the accuracy and completeness of discovering the evidence. This index is demonstrated 
through a model (TraceMap) to facilitate the investigator in tracing and mapping the evidence in order to identify the 
origin of the crime or incident. In this paper, tracing rate, mapping rate and offender identification rate are used to pre- 
sent the level of tracing ability, mapping ability and identifying the offender ability respectively. This research has a 
high potential of being expanded into other research areas such as in digital evidence presentation. 
 
Keywords: Digital Forensic Investigation; Traceability; Tracing Rate; Mapping Rate; Offender Identification Rate; 
Forensic Traceability Index; Trace Pattern 
1. Introduction 
Forensic or forensic science is the term given to an in- 
vestigation of a crime using scientific means or used to 
describe crime detection in general. It is the application 
of a broad spectrum of sciences to answer questions of 
interest to a legal system. The emergence of forensic 
comes from the incidence of criminal, illegal and inap- 
propriate behaviors.  
The field of forensic science is vast. The majority of 
the public are probably exposed to only a few different 
types of forensic. A sub-discipline of forensic known as 
digital forensic is developed to investigate any digital 
devices in the detection of crime. With the development 
of modern computers, network and the internet, com- 
puter-related crimes have become a threat to society be- 
cause of the immense damage it can inflict while at the 
same time it has reached a level of sophistication. This 
sophistication makes tracking the sources difficult.  
This paper highlights the tracking issues or also known 
as traceability aspects due to the complexity of the crime  
in digital forensic investigation process. The current tra- 
ctceability of cybercrimes basically allows two cones- 
quences. First is to identify the scope of an attack instead 
of the actual attacker and second is to assess the liability 
of an organization [1]. However, according to [1-3], there 
was a critical needs to deal with issue of origin identify- 
cation and cross referencing in investigation process. 
Hence, traceability is not only important to avoid mis- 
leading in decision making but also to ensure the valu- 
able information collected is complete and accurate. A 
methodology to overcome the traceability issue in digital 
forensic investigation process is developed by introduce- 
ing the evidence tracing and mapping procedures. These 
procedures were later used to formulate the traceability 
index. The ability to trace and map the evidence com- 
plete and accurately could assist in practitioner decision 
making. 
2. Related Work  
2.1. Digital Forensic Investigation Framework 
A common definition of digital forensic is the use of sci-  
entifically derived and proven methods toward the pro- 
cess of preservation, collection, validation, identification, *Corresponding author. 
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analysis, interpretation, documentation, and presentation 
of digital evidence which is derived from the digital 
sources [4]. The purpose of these processes is to facilitate 
the reconstruction of events or to help anticipate illegal 
actions. [5] had simplified the definition as the process of 
preservation, identification, extraction, documentation 
and interpretation of computer media for evidentiary and 
(or) root cause analysis.  
Though to some researchers the digital forensic is in- 
clusive of computer forensic, network forensic, software 
forensic and information forensic, but it is largely used 
interchangeably with computer forensic [3]. Computer 
forensic implies a connection between computers, the 
scientific method, and crime detection. It includes de- 
vices other than general-purpose computer systems such 
as network devices, cell phones, and other devices with 
embedded systems. There are over hundreds of digital 
forensic investigation procedures developed in digital 
forensic investigation practices. An organization tends to 
develop its own procedures and some focused on the 
technology aspects such as data acquisition or data analy- 
sis [6]. Most of these procedures were developed in tack- 
ling different technology used in the inspected device. As 
a result, when underlying technology of the target device 
changes, new procedures have to be developed. However, 
[7,8] stated that the process of the investigation should be 
incorporated with the basic procedures in forensic inves- 
tigation which are preparation, investigation and presen- 
tation. A categorization of investigation process was 
done in [9] to group and merge the similar activities or 
processes in five phases that provide the same output. 
The phases are: Phase 1 (Preparation), Phase 2 (Collec- 
tion and Preservation), Phase 3 (Examination and Analy- 
sis), Phase 4 (Presentation and Reporting), and Phase 5 
(Disseminating the case). The researcher also proposed a 
mapping process of digital forensic investigation process 
model to eliminate the redundancy of the process in- 
volved in the model and standardize the terms used in 
achieving the investigation goal.  
The analysis emphasized that most of the frameworks 
consist of Phase 2 (Collection and Preservation), Phase 3 
(Examination and Analysis), and Phase 4 (Presentation 
and Reporting) except Phase 1 and Phase 5. The analysis 
also propose that even though, Phase 1 and Phase 5 are 
not included in some of the framework, the study of 
[7,10-17] indicate the needs of both phases to confirm 
the completeness of the investigation. The purpose of 
Phase 1 comes in two objectives: 1) to approve that an 
investigation process can start and run in a proper pro- 
cedure, and 2) to protect the chain of the evidence. The 
purpose of Phase 5 is to avoid the possibility of the in- 
complete investigation and lack of improvement in in- 
vestigation procedures. From the analysis, it shows that 
an appropriate digital forensic investigation framework 
should at least consist of: Preparation Phase, Collection 
and Preservation Phase, Examination and Analysis Phase, 
Presentation and Reporting, and Disseminating the case. 
From the work done in [9], this paper focused on the 
Collection and Preservation Phase which has been identi- 
fied as one of the critical phases of the digital forensic 
investigation process model. The Collection and Preser- 
vation Phase is where the digital evidence is identified, 
collected and preserved which then is analyzed and ex- 
tracted to be presented in a court of law. However, to 
make it acceptable in court, there are two issues to be 
considered: the digital evidence itself and the collection 
process. 
2.2. Characteristic Issues of Digital Evidence 
[18] addressed four issues of digital evidence itself. First, 
the digital evidence is in a disorganized form and as such 
it can be very difficult to handle and not all of them is 
obviously readable by human. For example, a hard drive 
platter contains messy pieces of information mixed to- 
gether and layered on top of each other over time. Be- 
cause of that, only a small portion of the information is 
relevant to the case which makes it necessary to extract 
useful pieces, fit them together and translate them into a 
form that can be interpreted. Second, digital evidence 
generally is an abstraction of some event or digital object 
and can be seen as residual data that give a partial view 
of what occurred in the incident being investigated. Third, 
digital evidence can be maliciously altered or changed 
during collection without leaving any obvious trace indi- 
cating that alteration has taken place. This is due to the 
fact that computer data can be easily manipulated. Lastly, 
traditional evidences are created and retrieved as a single 
record but in a great majority of modern cases, it in- 
volves computerized system where evidence is created or 
retrieved from different records and sources. 
2.3. Managing Issues in the Collection Process of 
Digital Evidence  
In the collection process, the issues are the approach on 
collecting, analyzing and presenting the evidence. During 
collection process, the evidence is related to the aspect 
on how the evidence is searched, collected, analyzed, 
presented and documented without tampering the evi- 
dence and preserving the chain of evidence. In analyzing 
the evidence, the issue is about the aspect on the process 
of analysis. These cover all aspects such as the tools that 
are used for the analysis, the person responsible for the 
analysis and the integrity of the evidence. During the 
analysis process, the analysis tools used must be legally 
accepted, performed by experts or qualified person, and  
the evidence is not tampered. The issue on presenting the 
evidence is concerned with the approach of presenting 
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and documenting the evidence in an understandable man- 
ner to non-technical person such as jury and judge. 
Another problem during the collection process is the 
diversity of devices. In network, these devices generate a 
huge volume of evidence [19-21]. This situation leads to 
difficulty in identifying sources of the potential evidence 
or in tracing the evidence as stated in [22]. As it is 
important to obtain acceptable evidence in the court of 
law, the investigation must be successfully performed 
without tampering the evidence and also able to prove 
the evidence is legitimate. To solve the problem men- 
tioned above, the ability to track, link and preserve the 
chain of evidence in huge volume of evidence is crucial. 
Hence, the traceability is one of the important elements 
during the digital forensic investigation process in iden- 
tifying the origin and become the first challenge in the 
investigation as mentioned in [1-3]. 
2.4. The Tracing and Mapping in Digital 
Forensic Traceability 
Traceability gives meaningful information through the 
study of the related links. The collected digital evidence 
must give appropriate information or meanings to the 
collector. The information cannot be attained via single 
digital evidence as it is meaningless [23-26]. Therefore, 
to avoid meaningless information, the link between the 
collected digital evidence must be identified. The object- 
tive of traceability is to identify and track real or imagi- 
nary objects through a process chain [28]. Given the ori- 
gin of an object, traceability provides the opportunity to 
track a chain of events, or to predict process outcomes. 
The definition of traceability can be broad due to the 
complexity of it processes and the way it implemented 
[29,30]. For example, in networks, traceability refers to 
how difficult it is to establish the source and destination 
of communications on computers and communication 
networks.  
In this paper, traceability is defined as the ability to 
trace and map the events of an incident from different 
sources in order to obtain useful evidence and well man- 
aged. In order to have the evidence well managed, the 
works of [31-33] suggested that traceability can be es- 
tablished from the source evidence to its lower level evi- 
dence and from the lower level evidence back to their 
sources. This situation brings the concept of forward and 
backward traceability or called as bidirectional traceabil- 
ity approach as discussed by [33,34]. The concept was 
used and further extend as an enhanced traceability mo- 
del discussed in [35]. The discussed traceability model 
consists of definition, production and extraction. This 
model established the concepts of trace and map within  
the traceability: The process of establishing the structures 
is referred as tracing the digital evidence, whereas the 
process of putting the structure according to the hypothe- 
sis/scenario is referred as mapping the digital evidence. 
Next, the construction of tracing and mapping procedures 
from the model are explained. 
3. Method 
In this section, the experimental design to establish the 
trace and map concepts in traceability from the perspec- 
tive of digital forensic investigation is presented. It is 
note that while the traceability model is adapted from 
other domain, the model structure is able to be imple- 
mented in digital forensic investigation due to its com- 
patibility and capability. We present the data collection 
and data analysis through a controlled experiment for 
data scenario using malware intrusion. The findings from 
the analysis will be used as the primary guideline to es- 
tablish the generic incident trace pattern. The compo- 
nents of the trace pattern are used to formulate the trace- 
ability index for digital forensic investigation process. 
3.1. Inquisition of Incident Scenario 
In this research, a controlled experiment is designed to 
run the worm intrusion, to collect logs from each of the 
devices involved and to design the intrusion scenario. 
The design is motivated by [36]. In Rahmani et al. re- 
search, the experiment is focusing on DDoS attack that 
involves few processes which are declare attack setup, 
run selected attack, collect logged MIB variables and 
analyze result. It consists of four processes: Network 
Environment Setup, Attack Activation, Incident Log Col- 
lection and Incident Log Analysis as described in [37, 
38].  
In this experiment, the worm intrusion is launched and 
the intrusion activities are captured in the selected logs 
which are personal firewall log, security log, system log, 
application log, IDS log, tcpdump and Wireshark log. 
The researchers have collected all logs generated during 
the experiment and nine intrusion scenarios are derived 
based on the log analysis are identified. For the purpose 
of this paper, Scenario A as depicted in Figure 1 is se- 
lected as the example. Figure 1 illustrates the incident 
scenarios of Blaster A (Scenario A). In this incident sce- 
nario, the attack is activated in host Mohd and this host is 
successfully exploited all hosts except for hosts Ramly, 
Abdollah, Roslan and Sahib. Subsequently, one of the 
infected hosts, Selamat has organized an attack on host 
Ramly. In this incident scenario, the hosts that are 
marked with 1,354,444 and 69 are indicated as have been 
successfully being exploited by the attacker and have 
been infected. The hosts that are marked with 135 and 
4444 demonstrated the attacker has already opened the 
backdoor but has not successfully transferred the exploit 
odes through port 69. c  
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Figure 1. Blaster A incident-Scenario A. 
 
3.2. Identification of Incident Trace Pattern 
An attack pattern is defined as a mechanism to capture 
and communicate at the attacker perspective that shows 
the common methods for exploiting software, system or 
network [39-41]. It describes how an attack is performed, 
how the security pattern is enumerates to defeat the at- 
tack, and how to trace an attack once it has occurred 
[42,43]. It provides a systematic description of the attack 
goals and attack strategies to defend and trace the attack. 
Attack patterns can guide forensic investigators in 
searching the evidence. This also helps them at the data 
collection phase to determine and identify all the com- 
ponents to be collected, decide the priority of the data, 
find the location of the components and collect data from 
each of the component during the investigation process 
[43]. In general, attack pattern is very important in pro- 
viding a way to protect the system from any potential 
attack. The existing researches done by [39-43] reveal an 
attack pattern is a type of pattern that focuses on the at- 
tacker perspective while victim perspective is omitted. In 
forensic view, both perspectives are important. A victim 
or attacker can be identified based on the traces data  
found in the attack pattern analysis. In forensic, these 
traces data are represent in the form of trace pattern to 
determine how a crime is being committed.  
Trace pattern is defined as a regular way of process 
discovering the origin or starting point of a scenario that 
has happened. It is an essential element in helping invest- 
tigator in finding evidence of crime or incident. For ex- 
ample, in a digital crime the evidence can be found in 
any digital devices. The objective of these patterns is to 
provide clear view on how an attack is performed and its 
impact.  
Based on the previous work done in [37,38,44,45], 
three generic malware incident trace pattern for victim 
perspective, attacker perspective and multistep attacker 
perspective are established by observing the traces leave 
on the selected logs. For example, the generic malware 
incident trace pattern for victim perspective is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2 depicts the generic malware incident trace 
pattern for victim perspective consists of the incident 
traces (evidence) from host level and network level. In 
host level, three main events of the incident occur. The 
events are scan event, exploit event and impact/effect 
event. In this level, the scan event and exploit event occur 
in the personal firewall log. Whereas the incident traces 
of the impact/effect event are found in the system log, 
application log and security log.  
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Figure 2. Generic malware incident trace pattern-victim perspective. 
 
In this research, the personal firewall log is identified 
as the primary evidence and the generic attributes of this 
log are action, protocol and destination port. The secu- 
rity log, application log and system log are considered as 
the secondary evidence and the generic attributes of these 
logs are event id, image filename and event message.  
In network level, only two main events occurred 
namely exploit event and impact/effect event. In this level, 
the exploit event and impact/effect event exist in the IDS 
alert log. This IDS alert log is considered as secondary 
evidence and the generic attributes of this log are error 
message, source IP address, destination IP address and 
destination port. The attribute of error message indicates 
the exploiting activities and the attributes of source IP 
address, destination IP address and destination port in- 
dicate the impact of the attack that shows the offender of 
the incident (victim, attacker or multi-step attacker). 
In contrast, the generic malware incident trace pattern 
for attacker perspective consists of incident traces from 
host level and network level. In these levels, three events 
(scan, exploit and impact/effect) of the incidents occur at 
the host level and two events (scan and impact/effect) 
occur at the network level. The events at the network  
level show the difference between the generic malware 
incident trace pattern for victim perspective and generic 
malware incident trace pattern for attacker perspective.  
In victim perspective, it consists of exploit event and 
impact/effect event as highlighted in Figure 2 with the 
traces attributes are source IP address, destination IP 
address, destination port and error message compared to 
attacker perspective trace pattern, it consists of scan 
event and impact/effect event with the traces attributes 
are error message and source IP address. The generic 
malware incident trace pattern for multistep attacker 
perspective is similar to the generic malware incident 
trace pattern for victim perspective except for impact/ 
effect in network log. The considered traces attributes are 
only destination IP address and destination port for vic- 
tim; and error message and source IP address for multi- 
step attacker incident trace pattern. 
3.3. Constructing Tracing and Mapping 
Procedures 
The generic malware victim, attacker and multi-step at- 
tacker incident trace pattern then are used in formulating 
the tracing and mapping evidence procedures to demon- 
strate the ability of trace and map evidence (traceability) 
in digital forensic investigation process. Tracing evi-  
dence procedures are necessary in order to extract the 
incident traces from the logs [46]. However, the ex- 
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tracted traces are meaningless without knowing the rela- 
tion between those traces; hence identifying the relation- 
ships are important. These relationships can be identified 
by mapping or linking process [47].  
In this research, mapping the evidence is connecting or 
linking all traces discovered from the tracing activities by 
correlating the traces with the origin of the traces. The 
purpose of this mapping is to provide evidence that can 
answer the questions about the incident occurred. The 
mapping also is an aid to diagnostic the decision regard- 
ing to the incident. Due to the important of tracing and 
mapping evidence in digital forensic investigation pro- 
cess, the tracing and mapping procedures are formulated 
based on the proposed generic malware incident trace 
pattern as shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. 
As shown in Figure 3, the tracing processes are ini- 
tially started at the personal firewall log followed by 
security log, system log, application log and IDS alert 
log. The aim of these tracing processes is to examine the 
traces left in the logs by focusing the traces of three main 
events of an incident which are scan, exploit and im- 
pact/effect. Scan events can only be found in personal 
firewall log, while exploit events can be found in both 
personal firewall log and IDS alert log. The impact/effect 
events can be found in system, security and application 
logs. 
For example, the tracing procedure for tracing the 
incident traces from the personal firewall log starts with 
tracing the traces attributes identified in the proposed 
generic incident trace pattern. The traces attributes are 
perspective IP address, action, protocol and destination 
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Figure 3. Tracing procedures for tracing evidence of mal- 
ware incident. 
 
 
Figure 4. Mapping procedures of incident traces. 
 
port. The perspective IP address refers to the destination 
IP address or the source IP address of the perspective. 
Action indicates the perspective is trying to open the 
connection. Protocol and destination port show an attack 
is attempted to establish the communication. In this 
tracing process, any relevant set of traces that consist of 
destination port (x), action (y) and protocol (z) that are 
found in the personal firewall log is assigned as trace P.  
The tracing begin with some assumptions: 
Let Dp(x) = the set of all vulnerable destination ports 
that is used by malware in the incident 
Let Act(y) = the set of all actions that is used by mal- 
ware in the incident 
Let Pr(z) = the set of all protocols that is used by mal- 
ware in the incident 
Let Pn(x,y,z) = set of traces in personal firewall log 
A predicate is established that defines the traces as 
below: 
         Dp Act Pr P , ,nx y z x y z x y z       (1) 
which can defines that for all vulnerable destination port 
x, action y and protocol z, there exists trace of an incident 
from personal firewall log, such that  nP , ,x y z . 
The incident traces found from the tracing procedures 
are then mapped to show the relationship of the evidence 
of the incident discovered during the investigation proc- 
ess. The mapping procedures are depicted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 illustrates the mapping procedures of the in-  
cident traces discovered from the tracing process. Firstly, 
the traces that are discovered from the tracing process are 
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mapped within logs. For example, the traces discovered 
in personal firewall log are mapped with the traces dis- 
covered in the same log.  
relationship of the relevant incident traces at host level. 
In this process, the traces of incident in security log SEm 
are firstly mapped to the incident traces in system log 
SYm. The traces that are mapped are assigned to a new 
mapped trace  TM SE ,SYm m . These traces,  mTM SE ,SYm  are further mapped with the incident 
traces in personal firewall log Pm to produce a new 
mapped trace and assigned the trace as  ,PmTM SE ,SYm m . Finally, the mapped traces   ,P
TM S
TM SE ,SYm m m  are further mapped with application 
log APm to produce the complete mapped traces from 
host log and assigned as .   E ,SY ,P ,APm m m m
Secondly, the traces that are mapped from the first 
mapping process are further mapped between logs. For 
example, the traces discovered in personal firewall log 
are mapped to the traces discovered in security log.  
Thirdly, the traces that are mapped from the second 
mapping process are further mapped to the logs that are 
in different level of communication layer. For example, 
the traces mapped from the host logs (personal firewall 
log, security log, system log and application log) are 
further mapped to network log (IDS alert log).  In this research, the security log is identified as one of 
the important logs for malware incident; therefore the 
unmapped traces of incident in security log also are 
mapped with the traces of incident in personal firewall 
log. This mapping process produces a new mapped traces 
and assigned as  TM SE ,P ,APn m m . Hence, these map-
ping procedures can produce three types of mapped 
traces that consist of traces of incident from logs selected 
in this research:  
  ,AP ,TM SE ,Pm m n
Finally, the traces that are mapped from the third map- 
ping process are further mapped within devices. For ex- 
ample, the mapped traces that belong to the same devices 
will be mapped and merged to the same devices. In this 
research, the traces will be tagged for each new mapped 
trace. The objective of this tagging is to show the traces 
are already mapped between one trace to another trace 
either belongs to same log (within log), different logs 
(between logs), same level (host logs), different level 
(host and network logs) or same devices (within devices).  TM SE ,SY ,P ,APm m m m  and   ,APTM SE ,SY ,Pm m m m . These mapping procedures are 
summarized as illustrated in Figure 5. 
For example, in the mapping procedures for mapping 
traces of incident between logs (host log), the identified 
incident traces from specified host log are mapped within 
the same host. This mapping is required to identify the 
These tracing and mapping procedures have been im- 
plemented on the proposed model in the previous work 
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Figure 5. Mapping procedures for host incident traces. 
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done and discussed in [35,48]. A prototype version is 
developed in order to demonstrate the proposed model 
that called as TraceMap and can benefit the digital fo- 
rensic investigation research and community. The Trace- 
Map consist of generic trace pattern structure, tracing and 
mapping procedure, and offender identification proce- 
dure. Twelve datasets are seed into the TraceMap im- 
plementation and the result is generated as an incident 
report. 
4. Results 
The objective of this section is to identify the ability of 
the tracing and mapping procedures in the TraceMap 
implementation to discover the incident traces. This 
could facilitate the investigator in identifying the origin 
of the incident. In this research, three main capabilities 
need to be measured to identify the effectiveness of the 
TraceMap. The capabilities are tracing capability, map- 
ping capability and offender identification capability. 
Thus, the metrics for evaluation are formulated and fur- 
ther discussed in next subsection paper. 
4.1. Forensic Traceability Measurement 
According to [49], there is a need for security metrics in 
digital forensic that: 1) meet legal requirements for meas- 
ureable reliability, authenticity, accuracy and precision, 2) 
based on a sound scientific methodology properly ap- 
plied, and 3) have a basis provided for independent test- 
ing. Unfortunately, the digital forensic metric is not yet 
formulated and there is no industry consensus that a 
judge and jury can rely upon as adequate to support a 
claim and meet legal requirements for measurable reli- 
ability, authenticity, accuracy, and precision. These are 
currently elusive and must be constructed on a case-by- 
case basis. Due to this reason, it is possible to transfer 
concepts from another research area to build a metric to 
be used in the current research as described in [50]. 
Therefore, this research is proposed to transfer concepts 
from another research area to build a metric to measure 
the effectiveness of the tracing evidence (incident traces), 
mapping evidence (incident traces), and identifying the 
origin of the incident. 
Two metrics from other research domain, namely in- 
formation retrieval and IDS information theory is ex- 
plained to be used to build a metric for digital forensic. 
The aim is to measure the capability of tracing the inci- 
dent traces and to measure the capability of mapping the 
incident traces in the TraceMap respectively. 
In the concept of information retrieval, two metrics are 
used to measure the information retrieval; recall and pre- 
cision. In the field of information retrieval, precision is  
the fraction of retrieved documents that are relevant to 
the search whereas recall is the fraction of the documents 
that are relevant to the query that are successfully re- 
trieved [51]. This concept has been used in measuring the 
performance of the digital forensic investigation tools 
such as FTKTM and EncaseTM by measuring the query 
precision and query recall [52]. However, the classic 
precision-recall trade-off dilemma is that as recall in- 
creases, the query precision decreases. While digital fo- 
rensic seeks recall rates at or near 100%, query precision 
is usually low [53]. Thus, based on the aim of transfer- 
ring the concept of information retrieval mentioned pre- 
viously, the recall metric is adapted due to the aim of the 
tracing evidence (incident traces) in this research is to 
retrieve all relevant incident traces to the hypothesis 
(query). This metric is used to measure the capability of 
tracing evidence (incident traces) and later known as 
Tracing Rate (TCR). 
Tracing Rate (TCR) is the ratio of relevant traces dis- 
covered (output), relevant_traces  and the total traces (in- 
put), tota . This metric is represented as in Equa-
tion (2). 
N
l_tracesN
relevant_traces
total_traces
N
NR
TC              (2) 
where: 
relevant_traces  is the number of relevant traces discov- 
ered (output) from all potential sources of evidence 
N
total_traces  is the number of the traces (input) from all 
potential sources of evidence  
N
Equation (2) is used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the tracing process of the TraceMap. The result from this 
evaluation is used to demonstrate the capability of trac- 
ing evidence (incident traces) for digital forensic invest- 
tigation process.  
[54] use the concepts of information theory to moti- 
vate an information theoretic metric for IDS. This metric 
is used to measure the capability of detecting the intru- 
sion which is known as Intrusion Detection Capability 
(CID). CID is the ratio of mutual information between IDS 
input and output I(X,Y) and the entropy H(X) of the input 
that can be expressed as    IDC ,I X Y H X . The 
mutual information I(X;Y) corresponds to the intersec- 
tion of the information in X with the information in Y. 
The entropy H(X) is the sum of the mutual information of 
X and Y. Thus, based on the aim of transferring the con- 
cept of information theory used for IDS mentioned pre- 
viously, this metric is adapted in this research, in which 
the mutual information I(X;Y) is referred to the relevant 
incident traces that are mapped or connected. As a result, 
this metric is used to measure the capability of mapping 
the incident traces and is later known as Mapping Rate 
(MPR).  
Mapping Rate (MPR) is the ratio of the output traces 
that are relevant and mapped,  and the relevant_map_tracesN
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input traces that are relevant, . This metric is 
represented as in Equation (3). 
relevant_tracesN
relevant_map_traces
ant_tracesrelev
N
NR
MP               (3) 
where: 
relevant_map_traces  is the number of traces that is part of 
incident is relevant and mapped 
N
relevant_traces
Equation 3 is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
mapping procedures of the TraceMap on mapping the 
relevant traces of the incident within and between 
sources of evidence. The result from the evaluation is 
used to demonstrate the capability of mapping the inci- 
dent traces for digital forensic investigation process. 
N  is the number of the traces relevant traces  
In order to identify the evidence origin, there is a need 
to determine the rate of successfully origin found from 
the mapped traces. To achieve this, another metric is 
proposed named as Offender Identification Rate (OIR). 
This metric is significant in identifying the offenders 
(perspectives) of the incident. The Offender Identifica- 
tion Rate (OIR) is the ratio of mapped incident traces that 
are matched with the incident trace pattern,  
tracepattern_traces  and the number of traces that are relevant 
and mapped, relev . This metric is represented 
as in Equation (4). 
N
ant_map_tracesN
tracepattern_traces
levant_map_tracesre
N
NR
OI             (4) 
where: 
tracepattern_traces  is the number of mapped traces that 
can match with the perspective incident trace pattern 
N
relevant_map_traces  is the number of the traces that is rele- 
vant and mapped  
N
Equation (4) is used to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the TraceMap and the result from the evaluation is used 
to demonstrate the capability of identifying the offender 
or the origin of the incident. 
4.2. The Significant Findings of Tracing Process 
According to [52,53], the percentage of tracing rate and 
mapping rate imply the effectiveness level of the Trace- 
Map. To be specific, in order to indicate it effectiveness, 
the range of the rate percentage of TCR should be at or 
near 100% [52]. However, to the best of our knowledge, 
the range of rate percentage of MPR has not been men- 
tioned specifically in any research. Thus, in this paper, to 
show the accuracy of the incident traces, the level of MPR 
rate should be close to TCR rate. 
The effectiveness of the tracing process, mapping  
process and offender identification process is measured 
using the metrics proposed in this research. The metrics 
are Tracing Rate (TCR), Mapping Rate (MPR) and Of- 
fender Identification Rate (OIR). The objective of tracing 
is to discover the relevant incident traces of the incident. 
By using the proposed TCR metric, the results show the 
TraceMap is able to discover the relevant incident traces 
and could answer the incident from the range of 82.60% 
to 99.17%. The relevant traces discovered to the ir- 
relevant traces discovered are compared as depicted in 
Figure 6. 
The graph in Figure 6 shows that there is significant 
result in relevant incident traces especially in DS7, DS8 
and DS9. Overall, using the TraceMap, the relevant 
traces are 82.60% to 99.17% while irrelevant traces are 
0.83% to 17.40%. It means that out of 100 reported po- 
tential evidence for Incident A, the probability of suc- 
cessfully evidence traced as relevant to that particular 
incident is as maximum as 99%. 
4.3. The Comprehensiveness of Mapping Process 
In this research, the process of mapping is divided into 
four stages. The stages are mapping the incident traces 
within log, mapping the incident traces between logs 
(host logs), mapping the incident traces between logs 
(network logs) and mapping the incident traces within 
devices (hosts). In this process, the result from each stage 
becomes the input to the next stage. For example, the 
result obtained from the first stage (mapping incident 
traces within log) will be used as the input to the second 
stage (mapping incident traces between logs). For each 
stage, the mapping rates are measured using the mapping 
metric as in Equation 4. The summary of the result gen- 
erated is depicted in Table 1. 
In Table 1, the second column (Stage 1) demonstrates 
the process of mapping the incident traces within host 
logs or sensor logs in which the percentage of the map- 
ping rates are in the range of 82.60% to 99.96%. These 
rates show most of the relevant incident traces discov- 
ered has been mapped. It shows the number of traces that 
are relevant and mapped is consistent to the number of 
relevant traces discovered. These results indicate the ef- 
fectiveness of the mapping process for mapping the inci- 
dent traces within logs in which the most significant re- 
sult shown in DS4, DS5 and DS6 with the percentage of 
mapping rates are 99.90%, 99.95% and 99.96% respect- 
tively. 
The third column (Stage II) demonstrates the mapping 
process of the incident traces between logs. The result in 
this column implies that the incident traces from the 
mapping incident traces within log is the most relevant 
traces to be mapped. It shows that all relevant traces dis- 
covered from different sources of evidence are the most 
relevant traces that can be mapped between the logs be- 
long to the same devices or hosts with the percentage of 
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Figure 6. Rates of Relevant and Irrelevant Traces of Incident. 
 
Table 1. Summary of mapping rate (MPR). 
Stage 1 Stage II Stage III Stage IV 
Dataset % of Mapping Rate 
MPR 
% of Mapping Rate 
MPR 
% of Mapping Rate, 
MPR 
% of Mapping Rate, 
MPR 
DS1 97.61 100.00 69.57 100.00 
DS2 97.08 100.00 82.86 100.00 
DS3 82.60 100.00 66.67 100.00 
DS4 99.90 100.00 81.48 100.00 
DS5 99.95 100.00 87.80 100.00 
DS6 99.96 100.00 63.89 100.00 
DS7 99.31 100.00 77.27 100.00 
DS8 99.21 100.00 78.38 100.00 
DS9 98.92 100.00 74.29 100.00 
DS10 99.29 100.00 93.62 100.00 
DS11 99.10 100.00 78.57 100.00 
DS12 99.14 100.00 85.71 100.00 
 
the mapping rates are at 100%. These results indicate the 
process of mapping the incident traces between logs for 
host logs are effective and capable to map all relevant 
traces successfully. 
The fourth column (Stage III) depicts the percentage 
of the Mapping Rate (MPR) achieved in this process is in 
the range of 66.67% to 93.62% with the highest rate is 
obtained from Dataset 10 (DS10) and the lowest rate is 
obtained from Dataset 3 (DS3). These rates show the 
incident traces from network log is not probable to be 
mapped with the incident traces from host. These also 
reveal that it is difficult to prove the incident has hap- 
pened based on the evidence provided from network and 
this cause the origin identification of the incident become 
difficult. These findings show that some of the traces 
from the network log are considered as false alarm which 
is unrelated with the traces discovered in the host log. 
Even though the percentage of the mapping rate in this 
stage indicates a low rate because only one dataset has 
achieved the high percentage which is 93.62% compared 
to other dataset (66.67% to 87.80%). But, this mapping 
process is still effective since the mapping procedure in 
this stage is able to determine the relationship between 
traces from host log and traces from network log.  
Finally, the last column (Stage IV) shows the percent- 
age of the MPR is 100% for all dataset evaluated. These  
rates demonstrate the results from the third mapping 
process are the most relevant traces of the incident. The 
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rates also show the mapping process is completed in 
which all relevant incident traces are mapped. 
4.4. The Use of Trace Pattern for Successfulness 
Offender Identification 
The purpose of metric used in this process is to measure 
the effectiveness of TraceMap to assist the investigator 
in identifying all potential offenders involved in incident. 
In this research, the offender is named as perspective; 
victim, attacker and multi-step attacker (victim/attacker). 
The Offender identification Rate (OIR) is calculated using 
Equation 3 and the result generated is shows in Table 2. 
As shown in Table 2, the percentage rate for offender 
identification calculated from DS1 is 100% which indi- 
cates the offender has been successfully identified from 
all relevant incident traces mapped and matched with the 
hypothesis formulated at the beginning of the investiga- 
tion process.  
In the case of DS1, seven offenders (perspectives) are 
identified with four of them are victims, one attacker and 
two are multi-step attacker (victim/attacker). Although 
the percentage of the OIR is 100% for all datasets as de- 
picted in Table 2, three (DS2, DS3 and DS12) out of 
twelve dataset are unsuccessful in identifying the true 
attacker. These results are gained due to the traces identi- 
fied are not documented in any logs selected in this re- 
search. However, in such cases, the attacker can still be 
identified by analyzing the multi-step attacker (victim/ 
attacker) traces. 
5. Derivation of Traceability Metric in  
Digital Forensic Investigation Process 
As shown in Section IV, the traceability metric in this 
research, consists of Tracing Rate (TCR), Mapping Rate 
(MPR) and Offender Identification Rate (OIR).  
where: 
n as the maximum number of stage and i as the current 
stage 
relevant_traces  is the number of relevant traces discov- 
ered (output) from all potential sources of evidence 
N
total_traces  is the number of the traces (input) from all 
potential sources of evidence  
N
relevant_map_traces  is the number of traces that is part of 
incident that is relevant and mapped 
N
relevant_traces_TC  is the number of the traces relevant 
traces discovered (output) given by TC 
N
relevant_map_traces_MP_stage_of_  is the number of traces that 
is part of incident is relevant and mapped given by MP at 
the stage n 
N n
relevant_traces_MP  is the number of the traces relevant 
traces discovered (output) given by MP 
N
tracepattern_traces  is the number of mapped traces that 
can match with the perspective incident trace pattern, 
given by  
N
relevant_map_traces_MP_stage_of_
Hence, the whole metric for traceability in digital fo- 
rensic investigation process is derived as follow: 
N n
Tracing process equation: 
relevant_traces
total_traces
N
TC
N
                 (5) 
TC is used as N relevant traces in  for 
mapping process. 
stage_of_MP i
Mapping process Equation for stage : 1 n
relevant_map_traces
stage_of_
relevant_traces_TC
N
MP
Ni
            (6) 
stage_of_ 1
relevant_map_trace_MP_stage_of_ 1
relevant_traces_TC relevant_map_trace_MP_stage_of_
MP
N
N N
i
i
i

 
  (7) 
Therefore, the generic mapping process equation: 
relevant_map_traces
relevant_traces
N
MP
N
            (8) 
In order to complete the traceability of forensic, the 
identification of the origin is determined by the offender 
identification equation: 
relevant_map_traces_MP_stage_of_
relevant_map_traces_MP relevant_map_trace_MP_Stage_of_
N
N N
n
n
OI    (9) 
tracepattern_traces
relevant_map_traces
N
N
               (10) 
Thus, a traceability index for digital forensic investi- 
gation process named as Forensic Traceability Index is 
defined as: 
forensic
1
TraceIndex TC, MP,
n
i
OI

           (11) 
where the output of TC is used as the input of MP and 
the result of MP is used to identify the OI. 
This forensic  is a useful indicator in mea- 
suring the accuracy and the completeness of evidence. 
The results obtained prove that the TraceMap is an effec- 
tive model that supports the tracing and mapping evi- 
dence to overcome the traceability problem in digital 
forensic investigation process. 
TraceIndex
6. Conclusions 
This paper introduces an approach to overcome trace- 
ability issues in digital forensic investigation process. 
The approach which consists of generic trace pattern, and 
tracing and mapping procedure was embedded in a 
model named as TraceMap. This TraceMap is used to 
provide an effective way to trace and map digital evi-    
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Table 2. Summary of offender identification rate (OIR). 
Offender Identified 
Dataset 
Total Relevant and 
Mapped Traces 
Nrelevant_map_traces 
Total Trace  
Pattern Traces 
Ntracepattern_traces 
% of Offender  
Identification 
OIR Victim Attacker 
Multi-step 
Attacker 
DS1 7 7 100.00 4 1 2 
DS2 7 7 100.00 3 0 4 
DS3 8 8 100.00 5 0 3 
DS4 4 4 100.00 2 1 1 
DS5 4 4 100.00 1 1 2 
DS6 4 4 100.00 2 1 1 
DS7 4 4 100.00 1 1 2 
DS8 8 8 100.00 2 1 5 
DS9 7 7 100.00 2 1 4 
DS10 8 8 100.00 4 1 3 
DS11 8 8 100.00 5 1 2 
DS12 8 8 100.00 5 0 3 
 
7. Acknowledgements dence in digital forensic investigation process specifi- 
cally in collection and preservation phase. Thus, it fa- 
cilitates the investigator in formulating the hypothesis, 
identifying, tracing, mapping and presenting the digital 
evidence.  
This research was kindly supported by Universiti Tekni- 
kal Malaysia Melaka and Ministry of Higher Education 
Malaysia. 
In this TraceMap, the identification of offender is 
based on three primary events of incident which are scan, 
exploit and impact/effect. It could help the investigator in 
providing complete and accurate digital evidence to 
identify the origin of the incident. 
REFERENCES 
[1] E. Casey and G. L. Palmer, “Digital Evidence and Com- 
puter Crime,” 2nd Edition, Elsevier Academic Press, 
Cambridge, 2004. 
The results obtained in the experiment demonstrates 
the TraceMap is able to discover the evidence, able to 
connect or map the evidence and able to identify the ori- 
gin of the incident. These abilities are demonstrated 
through the result obtained using three metrics: Tracing 
Rate (TCR) Mapping Rate (MPR) and Offender Identifica- 
tion Rate (OIR).  
[2] D. Birk and C. Wegener, “Technical Issues of Forensic 
Investigations in Cloud Computing Environments,” Pro- 
ceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Systematic 
Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering, 26-26 May 
2011, Oakland, pp. 1-10. 
[3] P. Stephenson, “A Comprehensive Approach to Digital 
Incident Investigation,” Information Security Technical 
Report, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2003, pp. 42-54. 
The Tracing Rate (TCR) are used to demonstrate the 
ability of discovering the evidence, Mapping Rate (MPR) 
is used to demonstrate the ability of mapping the evi- 
dence and Offender Identification Rate (OIR) is used to 
demonstrate the ability of identifying the origin of the 
incident.  
[4] G. Palmer, “A Road Map for Digital Forensic Research,” 
Technical Report (DTR-T001-01) for Digital Forensic 
Research Workshop (DFRWS), New York, 2001. 
[5] W. Kruse and J. Heiser, “Computer Forensics: Incident 
Response Essentials,” Addison Wesley, Indianapolis, 2002. 
[6] A. Brill and M. Pollitt, “The Evolution of Computer Fo- 
rensic Best Practices: An Update on Programs and Publi- 
cations,” Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Vol. 1, No. 
1, 2006, pp. 3-11. doi:10.1080/15567280500541488 
Based on these metrics, traceability index  
( forensicT ) is derived that can be used in digital 
forensic investigation process to help the practitioner in 
measuring the accuracy and completeness of the evi- 
dence discovery. This research has a high potential of 
being expanded into other research areas such as in digi- 
tal evidence presentation. 
raceIndex
[7] M. Kohn, J. Eloff and M. Olivier, “Framework for a Di- 
gital Forenisc Investigation,” Proceedings of the Informa- 
tion Security South Africa (ISSA) 2006 from Insight to 
Foresight Conference, Sandton, 5-7 July 2006, pp. 1-7. 
[8] S. Satpathy, S. K. Pradhan and B. B. Ray, “A Digital 
S. R. SELAMAT  ET  AL. 31
Investigation Tool based on Data Fusion in Management 
of Cyber Security Systems,” International Journal of In- 
formation Technology and Knowledge Management, Vol. 
2, No. 2, 2010, pp. 561-565. 
[9] S. S. Rahayu, Y. Robiah and S. Shahrin, “Mapping Proc-
ess of Digital Forensic Investigation Framework,” Inter-
national Journal of Computer Science and Network Secu-
rity, Vol. 8, No. 10, 2008, pp. 163-169. 
[10] V. Baryamureeba and F. Tushabe, “The Enhanced Digital 
Investigation Process Model,” Proceedings of the Digital 
Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS), 11-13 August 
2004, Baltimore, pp. 1-9. 
[11] B. Carrier and E. Spafford, “Getting Physical with the 
Digital Investigation Process,” International Journal of 
Digital Evidence, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003, pp. 1-21. 
[12] S. Ó. Ciardhuáin, “An Extended Model of Cybercrime 
Investigations,” International Journal of Digital Evidence, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1-22. 
[13] M. Roger, “DCSA: Applied Digital Crime Scene Analy- 
sis,” Handbook of Information Security, New York, 2006. 
[14] M. Reith, C. Carr and G. Gunsch, “An Examination of 
Digital Forensic Models,” International Journal of Digi- 
tal Evidence, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, pp. 1-12. 
[15] N. L. Beebe and J. G. Clark, “A Hierarchical, Objec- 
tives-Based Framework for the Digital Investigations 
Process,” Proceedings of the Digital Forensic Research 
Workshop (DFRWS), 11-13 August 2004, Baltimore, pp. 
146-166. 
[16] F. C. Freiling and B. Schwittay, “A Common Process 
Model for Incident Response and Computer Forensics,” 
Proceedings of the Conference on IT Incident Manage- 
ment and IT Forensics, 11-13 September 2007, Stuttgart, 
pp. 1-21. 
[17] S. Perumal, “Digital Forensic Model Based on Malaysian 
Investigation Process,” International Journal of Com- 
puter Science and Network Security, Vol. 9, No. 8, 2009, 
pp. 38-44. 
[18] S. Rekhis, J. Krichene and N. Boudriga, “Cognitive-Maps 
Based Investigation of Digital Security Incident,” Pro- 
ceedings of the Third International Workshop on System- 
atic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering, Oak- 
land, 22 May 2008, pp. 25-40. 
[19] S. L. Garfinkel, “Digital Forensics Research: The next 10 
Years,” Journal of Digital Investigation, Vol. 7, 2010, pp. 
S64-S73.  
[20] T. Lindsey, “Challenges in Digital Forensics,” The Digi- 
tal Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS), New York, 
2006. 
[21] K. Nance, B. Hay and M. Bishop, “Digital Forensics: 
Defining a Research Agenda,” Proceedings of the 42nd 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Big 
Island, 5-8 January 2009, pp. 1-6. 
[22] C. Shields, O. Frieder and M. Maloof, “A System for the 
Proactive, Continuous and Efficient Collection of Digital 
Forensic Evidence,” Journal of Digital Investigation, Vol. 
8, 2011, pp. S3-S13. doi:10.1016/j.diin.2011.05.002 
[23] A. Ahmad, “The Forensic Chain-of-Evidence Model:  
Improving the Process of Evidence Collection in Incident 
Handling Procedures,” Proceedings of the 6th Asia Con- 
ference on Information Systems (PACIS 2002), 2-4 Sep- 
tember 2002, Tokyo pp. 1-5. 
[24] V. H. Bhat, P. G. Rao, R. V. Abhilash, P. D. Shenoy, K. 
R. Venugopal and L. M. Patnaik, “A Data Mining Ap- 
proach for Data Generation and Analysis for Digital Fo- 
rensic Application,” IACSIT International Journal of En- 
gineering and Technology, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2010, pp. 314- 
319. 
[25] G. Giova, “Improving Chain of Custody in Forensic In- 
vestigation of Electronic Digital Systems,” International 
Journal of Computer Science and Network Security, Vol. 
11, No. 1, 2011, pp. 1-9. 
[26] J. Herrerias and R. Gomez, “A Log Correlation Model to 
Support the Evidence Search Process in a Forensic Inves- 
tigation,” Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop 
on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineer- 
ing (SADFE’07), Bell Harbor, 10-12 April 2007, pp. 31- 
42. doi:10.1109/SADFE.2007.1 
[27] P. Sommer, “Intrusion Detection Systems as Evidence,” 
Computer Networks, Vol. 31, No. 23, 1999, pp. 2477-2487. 
doi:10.1016/S1389-1286(99)00113-9 
[28] P. Oghazi, B. Palsson and K. Tano, “An Attempt to Ap- 
ply Traceability to Grinding Circuits,” Proceedings of the 
Conference in Mineral Processing, Lulea, 6-7 February 
2007, pp. 169-183. 
[29] R. Clayton, “Anonymity and Traceability in Cyberspace,” 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 2005. 
[30] E. Golan, B. Krissoff, F. Kuchler, L. Calvin, K. Nelson 
and G. Price, “Traceability in the U.S. Food Supply: Eco- 
nomic Theory and Industry Studies,” Department of Ag- 
riculture, Washington DC, 2004. 
[31] G. Zemont, “Towards Value-Based Requirements Trace- 
ability,” Master Thesis, DePaul University, Chicago, 
2005. 
[32] M. Narmanli, “A Business Rule Approach to Require- 
ments Traceability,” Master Thesis, Middle East Techni- 
cal University, Ankara, 2010. 
[33] Morckos, M. “Requirements Traceability,” Report for 
School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, 
Waterloo, 2011. 
[34] L. Westfall, “Bidirectional Requirements Traceability,” 
White Paper, The Westfall Team, Dallas, 2006. 
[35] S. R. Selamat, R. Yusof, S. Sahib, M. F. Abdollah, M. Z. 
Mas’ud and I. Roslan, “Adapting Traceability in Digital 
Forensic Investigation Process,” Proceedings of the Ma- 
laysian Technical Universities International Conference 
on Engineering and Technology (MUiCET 2011), Johor, 
13-15 November 2011, pp. 1-8. 
[36] C. Rahmani, M. Sharifi and T. Tafazzoli, “An Exprimen- 
tal Analysis of Proactive Detection of Distributed Denial 
of Service Attacks,” Proceedings of the IIT Kanpur Ha- 
cker’s Workshop (IITKHACK04), 23-24 February 2004, 
Kanpur, pp. 37-44. 
[37] S. R. Selamat, R. Yusof, S. Sahib, M. F. Abdollah, M. Z. 
Masud and I. Roslan, “Tracing technique for Blaster At- 
tack,” International Journal of Computer Science and In- 
formation Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1-8.  
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                   JIS 
S. R. SELAMAT  ET  AL. 
Copyright © 2013 SciRes.                                                                                   JIS 
32 
[38] S. R. Selamat, R. Yusof, S. Sahib, M. Z. Masud, I. Roslan 
and M. F. Abdollah, “Scenario Based Worm Trace Pat-
tern Identification Technique,” International Journal of 
Computer Science and Information Security, Vol. 7, No. 
1, 2010, pp. 1-9. 
[39] S. R. Selamat, R. Yusof, S. Sahib, M. Z. Masud, M. F. 
Abdollah and Z. Z. Abidin, “Advanced Trace Pattern for 
Computer Intrusion Discovery,” Journal of Computing, 
Vol. 2, No. 6, 2010, pp. 200-207.  
[40] G. Hoglund and G. McGraw, “Exploiting Software: How 
to Break Code,” Addison-Wesley/Pearson, Indianapolis, 
2004. 
[41] A. Moore, R. Ellison and R. Linger, “Attack Modeling 
for Information Security and Survability. Technical Note 
(CMU/SEI-2001-TN-001) for Software,” Carnegie Mel- 
lon University, Pittsburgh, 2001.  
[42] B. Sean and S. Amit, “Introduction to Attack Patterns,” 
2006. https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/  
[43] Fernandez, E., Pelaez, J. and M. Larrondo-Petrie, “Attack 
Patterns: A New Forensic and Design Tool,” Advances in 
Digital Forensics III, Proceeding of Third Annual IFIP 
WG 11.9 International Conference o Digital Forensics, 
28-31 January 2007, Cozumel, pp. 345-357.  
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-73742-3_24 
[44] K. Kent, S. Chevalier, T. Grance and H. Dang, “Guide to 
Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response,” 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 
Gaithersburg, 2006, 
[45] R. Yusof , S. R. Selamat, S. Sahib, M. F. Abdollah, M. Z. 
Masud and M. Ramly, “An Improved Traditional Worm 
Attack Pattern,” Proceedings of the 4th International Sym- 
posium on Information Technology 2010 (ITSIM 2010), 17 
June 2010, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 1067-1072.  
[46] R. Yusof, S. R. Selamat, S. Sahib, M. F. Abdollah, M. Z. 
Mas’ud and M. Ramly, “A New Malware Attack Pattern 
Generalization,” Proceedings of the Malaysian Technical 
Universities International Conference on Engineering 
and Technology (MUiCET 2011), Johor, 13-15 November 
2011, pp. 20-29. 
[47] J. Velasco, “A Guide to Electronic Evidence Collection 
Methodologies,” White Paper, RenewData Corporation, 
Austin, 2007. 
[48] A. Hassanzadeh and B. Sadeghiyan, “A Data Correlation 
Method for Anomaly Detection Systems using Regres- 
sion Relations,” Proceedings of the 1st International 
Conference on Future Information Networks, Beijing, 
14-17 October 2009, pp. 242-248. 
[49] S. R. Selamat, R. Yusof, S. Sahib, N. H. Hassan, M. Z. 
Mas’ud, Z. Z. and Abidin, “Traceability in Digital Foren- 
sic Investigation Process,” Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Open Systems, Langkawi, 25-28 September 
2011, pp. 101-106. 
[50] F. Cohen, “Metrics for Digital Forensics,” Proceedings of 
the MiniMetriCon Conference, 14 February 2011, San Fran- 
cisco, pp. 1-22. 
[51] Holz, T. (2008, “Security Measurements and Metrics for 
Networks,” Dependability Metrics: Advanced Lectures 
Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Vol. 4909, pp. 
157-165. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68947-8_13 
[52] A. Al-Dallal and R. S. Abdulwahab, “Achieving High 
Recall and Precision with HTLM Documents: An Inno- 
vation Approach in Information Retrieval,” Proceedings 
of the World Congress on Engineering (WCE 2011), 6-8 
July2011, London, pp. 1-6. 
[53] N. L. Beebe and J. G. Clark, “Digital Forensic Text String 
Searching: Improving Information Retrieval Effectiveness 
by Thematically Clustering Search Results,” Journal of 
Digital Investigation, Vol. 4, 2007, pp. S49-S54.  
doi:10.1016/j.diin.2007.06.005 
[54] G. Peterson, S. Shenoi and N. Beebe, “Digital Forensic 
Research: The Good, the Bad and the Unaddressed,” Ad- 
vances in Digital Forensics V, Vol. 306, 2009, pp. 17-36. 
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04155-6 
[55] G. Gu, P. Fogla, D. Dagon, W. Lee and B. Skoric, “To- 
wards an Information-theoretic Framework for Analyzing 
Intrusion Detection Systems,” Proceedings of the 11st 
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security 
(ESORICS’06), 18-20 September 2006, Hamburg, pp. 1- 
20. 
 
 
